Northern Illinois University Law Review
Volume 23

Issue 1

Article 2

11-1-2002

"Shaming" Probation Penalties and the Sexual Offender: A
Dangerous Combination
Kenya A. Jenkins

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/niulr
Part of the Law Commons

Suggested Citation
Kenya A. Jenkins, Comment, "Shaming" Probation Penalties and the Sexual Offender: A Dangerous
Combination, 23 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 81 (2002).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Huskie Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Northern Illinois University Law Review by an authorized editor of Huskie Commons. For
more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

"Shaming" Probation Penalties and the
Sexual Offender: A Dangerous Combination
INTRODUCTION

ne of the biggest fears pertaining to crime in the United States today
is the idea of a sex offender being in one's neighborhood.' Despite
the public's fear and anger at such crimes, all sexual offenders
cannot be put in prison.2 Therefore, some sexual offenders, notwithstanding
a community's outcry, will be put on probation.3 The idea of children
being the victims of sexual abuse and/or molestation is much more than
many people can handle. Questions that come into the minds of many
people include: "How do we know if our children are safe? What can we
do to protect our community? Why would they let such a person out on the
street?" Looking at statistics, one could easily argue that these fears are
legitimate. Sexual offenders have a high rate of recidivism, and it seems5
as though counseling and prison do not help prevent this recidivism.
These fears and questions have led to a plethora of legislation and court

1.
See Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Law in the 1990's: A Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Analysis, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 505 (1998) (stating that individuals
who commit sex offenses against children are probably the most hated group in our
society.); See also, Downtown 20/20: No Escape (ABC television broadcast, June 18, 2001)
[hereinafter 20/20] (Don Dahler of ABC News states, "It's a no-brainer. Convicted sex
offenders are bad people, the lowest of the low, perverts. That is sure what a lot of people
think here in Corpus Christi, Texas.").
2.
See infra note 76 (noting that prisons are overcrowded).
3.
See infra note 76 (stating that judges are looking at alternatives to
incarceration).
4.
See William Raspberry, Did the Judge Go Too Far, TULSA WORLD, June 5,
2001, at 9 (stating that sexual offenders are not easy to change), available at 2001 WL
6930500. The author quoted Duke University psychologist, Robert Carson, as stating:

Id.

Nothing has as yet been devised to give reasonable assurance of
non-recidivism for such individuals. That's true of rapists and child
molesters and even of such milder offenders as exhibitionists and
peepers. The only thing that has worked-apart from permanent
incarceration until old age-is the very expensive way of constant
monitoring by trained parole officers and the like.
5.

See id.
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orders in order to better protect the community. 6 Legislation such as
"Megan's Law" has been introduced specifically to allow the community to
be notified if there is a sexual abuser in their neighborhood.7 A sexual
offender must now notify the police and the community of their crimes.8
The public outrage at these types of crimes has led trial courts to take an
even more drastic measure: shaming conditions. 9 If a person is convicted of
a sexual crime and put on probation, the judge may add on unexpected
conditions.10 Probation conditions that require offenders to post signs and
bumper stickers announcing their crimes are called "shaming" conditions."
In various states, trial courts have begun ordering sex offenders to follow
such probation conditions.' 2 These conditions for sexual offenders have
come to the forefront of debate once again because of Judge J. Manuel
Banales, a state district judge in Corpus Christi, Texas. 13 Judge Banales
has ordered sex offenders on probation to post signs in front of their houses
and put bumper stickers on their cars that state, "Danger. Registered Sex
Offender Lives Here," and "Danger. Registered Sex Offender in Vehicle,"
respectively. 14 The high rate at which Judge Banales is requiring such

6.
See generally Winick, supra note I (examining different legislations for dealing
with sexual offenders; such as the civil commitment of sexual offenders through violent
predator laws, and community registration laws).
7.
Id. at 549-50 (noting that currently every state requires sexual offenders to
register their whereabouts in order to give information to people in the community). See
also, Kerri L. Arnone, Note, Megan's Law and Habeas Corpus Review: Lifetime Duty With
No Possibility of Relief, 42 ARiz. L. REV. 157, 160-61 (2000) (stating that all fifty states
have statutes which require sex offenders to register with local law enforcement agencies
whenever they enter a jurisdiction. Also, most state statutes require that sex offenders
periodically verify their address with law enforcement).
8.
Id.
9.
Larry Copeland, Does "Scarlet Letter" Judge Cross the Line?, USA TODAY,
July 10, 2001, at 5A (noting that Judge Banales made the sign order shortly after a girl was
almost sexually assaulted by a man with a prior conviction for a sexual offense).
10. See id.
11. See People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315, 318-19 (Ill. 1997) (holding that
probation conditions that label a defendant's person or property are "shaming" penalties).
12. See Cathy Booth Thomas & Hilary Hylton, A New Scarlet Letter: A Texas
Judge Forces Sex Offenders to Broadcast Their Crimes With House Signs and Bumper
Stickers, TIME, June 11, 2001, at 82 (stating that judges in Texas, Florida, Oregon, and
Louisiana begun ordering individual sexual offenders to put signs in their yards), available
at 2001 WL 22574380.
13. Philip Delves Broughton, Judge Drives Home Sex Crime Message, THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH, May 30, 2001, availableat 2001 WL 22440340.
14. Id.; see also, Copeland, supra note 9. In order to make sure that the required
signs and bumper stickers are shown in plain view there is a task force known as "The Sex
Offender Unit," consisting of four members of the Corpus Christi Adult Probation Unit.
20/20, supra note 1. This task force looks for sex offenders that refuse to put up the signs
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signs has the debate on shaming penalties at its zenith; in a matter of a few
days, Judge Banales ordered fifteen convicted
sex offenders to comply with
5
the sign and bumper sticker requirement.'
The purpose of this comment is to examine the use of "shaming" in
the probation conditions of sex offenders. This comment examines the use
of such conditions and the effect such conditions could have on the
offender and the community as a whole. Part I discusses whether such
conditions would pass a constitutional test. It first addresses whether
compelled speech is protected under the First Amendment, and then
decides if these conditions violate a probationer's right not to be compelled
to speak under the First Amendment. It then explores whether a violation
of a probationer's First Amendment right is acceptable because the
individual is on probation. Part II analyzes the purpose of probation from
the perspective of the community and the probationer. It details what the
goals of probation are, and what restrictions are placed upon the trial court
in determining probation conditions. Part III describes a psychological
analysis of the sexual offender. It investigates who would likely commit a
sexual offense a second time, and analyzes psychological studies which
examined whether treatment lowers the rate of recidivism in sexual
offenders. Part IV looks at "shaming" conditions, and considers whether
they rationally relate to the goals of probation. It also discusses, from a
psychological standpoint, whether such punishments work at all. Finally,
Part V takes a close examination of some solutions. It suggests that more
narrowly tailored sentencing guidelines or legislative amendments in the
criminal codes can help maximize a probationer's potential for
rehabilitation, while minimizing the sexual offender's danger to society.
I.

SHAMING CONDITIONS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

A. INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT NOT TO BE COMPELLED TO SPEAK

The first issued raised by these "shaming" conditions, which require
sexual offenders to post signs on their homes and bumper stickers on their
cars, is whether these conditions violate their First Amendment right to
freedom of speech. In order to better analyze this issue, this comment will
examine several court opinions that give a clearer illustration of what an
and bumper stickers. Id. For example, the unit saw a car in front of the warning sign posted
in the yard, and the bumper sticker on the car was covered with mud. Therefore, the unit
required the car to be moved and the bumper sticker cleaned off. Id.
15. Thomas & Hylton, supra note 12, at 82 (stating that Judge Banales "drew
national attention by applying his ruling to so many people at one time.").
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individual's First Amendment rights of not being compelled to speak are in
the United States.
16
1. West Virginia State Board of Educationv. Barnette

The West Virginia Board of Education passed a resolution requiring
all teachers and students in the public schools to salute the American flag.17
A suit was brought seeking an injunction in order to stop enforcement of
this regulation against Jehovah's Witnesses, because saluting a flag
offended their religious beliefs.1 8 The Supreme Court held that compelling
students to salute the flag goes beyond the limits of the Constitution, and
"invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First
Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control."' 9
2. Wooley v. Maynard 20
A New Hampshire law made it a crime to conceal the words "Live
Free or Die" on its license plates.2 ' The Maynards stated that the phrase
was adverse to their religious beliefs, and asked that the law no longer be
enforced. The Supreme Court held that "the right of freedom of thought
protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the
right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. 23 The
Supreme Court found that this New Hampshire statute made the Maynards

16. W. Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
17. Id. at 626. A student's refusal to salute the flag was considered insubordination,
which resulted in the expulsion of the student, until she agreed to comply. Id. at 629. The
expelled child was considered a delinquent, and his or her parents were liable for
prosecution. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.at 642. The Supreme Court also stated, "[t]o sustain the compulsory flag
salute we are required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's right to
speak his own mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in
his mind." Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634.
20. .Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
21. Id.at 708.
22. Id. Mr. Maynard clipped the words "or die" off the license plate, and covered
"live free" in tape. He was given three citations, and refused to pay the fines. Id. 708 & n.4.
He was forced to spend 15 days in jail. Id. at 708. The Maynards brought suit in the United
States District Court for injunctive and declaratory relief against the enforcement of the
statute. Id. at 709.
23. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714. (noting that "[tihe right to speak and refrain from
speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of
mind."').
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use their private vehicles as a "mobile billboard" for the beliefs and
opinions of the State.24 The Court noted that the First Amendment protects
the individual who: (1) has different viewpoints than the majority; and, (2)25
refuses to accept any ideal that the individual finds morally objectionable.
The Supreme Court of the United States then held that New Hampshire
force the Maynards to display "Live Free or Die" on their license
could not
26
plates.
27

3. Pacific Gas and Electric v. Public Utilities Commission of California

The California Public Utilities Commission ordered Pacific Gas to
place the opinions of a third party in the company's newsletter that it sent
with its monthly bill.28 Pacific Gas argued, "that it has a First Amendment
right not to help spread a message with which it disagrees, and that the
Commission's order infringes that right., 29 The United States Supreme
Court held that the Commission's order violated Pacific Gas' First
them to associate with the views of others
Amendment rights by forcing
30
with whom they disagree.
Based on the Supreme Court's holdings in Maynard and Pacific Gas,
it should be understood that the Government cannot force anyone to put up
a sign in their residence or car if that person is unwilling to do so. 3' Every
individual not only has the right to speak as he pleases, but an individual
also has a right not to speak if he chooses not to.32 The right not to be
compelled to speak has been a part of our court precedent for over half a
century.33 Therefore, it would seem as if the probation condition requiring
sexual offenders to post signs and bumper stickers warning others about

24. Id. at715.
25. Id. The court stated that though most Americans agree with the New Hampshire
motto, this fact is not the test.
26. Id. at717.
27. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
28. Id. at 5-7.
29. Id.at7.
30. Id.at 20-21. The Supreme Court also noted, "[c]ompelled access like that
ordered in this case both penalizes the expression of the particular points of view and forces
speakers to alter their speech to conform with an agenda they do not set." Id.at 9.
31. See, e.g., Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717 (holding that government cannot require an
individual to post messages on their private property that she disagrees with).
32. See, e.g., Id. at 714.
33. See generally Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (case decided in 1943, and held that the
government could not compel students to salute the flag).
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their crimes violates their First Amendment right to freedom of speech.34
However, this is not necessarily the case; as will be seen, those on
probation do not have35 the same rights under the constitution that the
ordinary person enjoys.
B. CAN INDIVIDUALS ON PROBATION LOSE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT?

Forcing people to place a sign on their residence or car violates their
First Amendment right not to be compelled to speak.36 The next question is
whether an individual on probation has the same fundamental rights as
others in America. Can trial courts infringe on probationers' fundamental
right not to be compelled to speak?
Individuals on probation and parole are subject to restrictions, which
common people are not.37 The trial court has a right to set conditions of
probation that infringe on a probationer's fundamental rights.38 Although
probation conditions can impair a probationer's constitutional rights, these
requirements must be reasonably related to the goals of the sentence and
involve only deprivations of liberty that are reasonably necessary to meet
these purposes. 39 There are several fundamental rights that courts have
found do not apply to probationers, including their right to travel, 40 and

34. See supra Part I.A. 1-3.
35. See discussion infra Part I.B.
36. See discussion supra Part I.A.
37. United States v. Bee, 162 F.3d 1232, 1234 (9th Cir. 1998).
38. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Pike, 701 N.E.2d 951, 959 (Mass. 1998) (noting
that trial courts "may place restrictions on probationers' freedoms that would be
unconstitutional if applied to the general public.").
39. United States v. Stafford, 983 F.2d 25, 28 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Johnson v.
State, 659 N.E.2d 194, 200 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). The Indiana appellate court held that
"[clonvicted individuals do not enjoy the same constitutional protections as law-abiding
citizens. In the context of these constitutional freedoms, a state action is valid if reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests." Id.
40. See, e.g., Pike, 701 N.E.2d at 959 (recognizing that a fundamental right to
interstate travel is not immune from constraint through probation requirements). In United
States v. Tortora, the defendant, a citizen of a different country, entered a guilty plea for a
misdemeanor offense after giving money to a bank officer in order to secure a loan. United
States v. Tortora, 994 F.2d 79, 80 (2d Cir. 1993). The court gave the defendant five years of
probation, and as a condition stated that the defendant could not leave the United States until
he paid restitution. Id. at 80-81. The appellate court vacated the district court's decision,
and stated that the court can restrict the defendant's right to travel, but it cannot extend
beyond the probationary period. Id. at 82. See also Lacy v. State in which, a defendant
convicted of driving while intoxicated received a probation condition that did not allow him
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right of free association. 41 The following cases will help shed more light
on the extent to which probationers are permitted to exercise their
fundamental right to free speech.
1.

United States v. Bee

42

The defendant pled guilty to sexually abusing a six-year-old girl,43 and
was sentenced to prison to be followed by supervised release." As a
condition of his supervised release, the trial court prohibited the defendant
from possessing any sexually stimulating material. 45 The defendant argued
that this condition infringed upon his First Amendment rights.46 The
appellate court upheld the condition stating that it did not impermissibly
intrude on the defendant's First Amendment rights.47
2.

48
United States v. Ritter

The defendant pled guilty to embezzling money from a bank where he
was employed. 49 The defendant was sentenced to "thirty days in custody,
with a halfway house and work privilege recommendation, followed by a
period of three years of supervised release., 50 As a special condition of his
supervised release, he was to notify all present and future employers of his

to attend any bars, taverns, or similar places. Lacy v. State, 875 S.W.2d 3, 4 (Tex. Ct. App.
1994). The Court of Appeals of Texas upheld this condition. Id. at 5.
41.
In United States v. Schave, the defendant, a member of a white supremacist
group, sold explosives to an undercover agent pretending to be a member of the
organization. United States v. Schave, 186 F.3d 839, 840 (7th Cir. 1999). These explosives
were supposed to be used in furtherance of white supremacist aims. Id. The defendant was
sentenced to imprisonment, to be followed by supervised release. Id. One of the conditions
of the supervised release restricted the defendant, "from associating with organizations that,
or their members who, espouse violence or the supremacy of the white race." Id. at 841. The
defendant challenged the condition as an unconstitutional restriction on his right to
associate. Id. The appellate court upheld the condition, despite the fact that it limited the
defendant's associational rights. Id. at 843-44.
42.
162 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 1998).
43. Id. at 1234.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1235.
48. United States v. Ritter, 118 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 1997).
49. Id. at 503.
50. Id.
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embezzlement conviction." The defendant claimed that the condition
violated his First Amendment right to free speech. 2 The appellate court
held that this condition was53necessary and only minimally intruded upon
his First Amendment rights.
3.

54
United States v. Turner

55
The defendant was convicted of obstruction of a federal court order,
and sentenced to one year of probation. 6 A requirement of the probation
was that the defendant could not "harass, intimidate or picket in front of
any gynecological or abortion family planning services center., 57 The
defendant asserted that this condition was a violation of her First
Amendment rights. 58 The appellate court upheld these conditions, stating
that they evidenced a reasonable relationship to the goals of probation.5 9

4.

60
Johnson v. State

The defendants, who protested at a Planned Parenthood clinic, were
convicted of obstructing pedestrian traffic and of criminal trespass. 6' The
defendants received a suspended sentence and two years of probation.62
One of the conditions of their probation was that they attend an eight-hour
reproductive health lecture sponsored by Planned Parenthood.63 The
defendants argued that this requirement violated their First Amendment

51. ld.at 504.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 505-06.
54. United States v. Turner, 44 F.3d 900 (10th Cir. 1995).
55. Id. at 901. The federal court order prohibited "trespassing on, sitting in,
blocking, impeding or obstruct[ing] ingress into or egress from any facility at which
abortions, family planning, or gynecological services are provided by plaintiffs in Wichita,
Kansas." Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 903.
58. Id.
59. Id. (noting that given the defendant's strong convictions against abortion, if she
were allowed to protest at clinics that give abortions, she might not be able to keep her
actions within the parameters of the law).
60. Johnson v. State, 659 N.E.2d 194 (Ind.Ct. App. 1996).
61. Id.at 196.
62. Id. at 197.
63. Id.
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right to freedom of speech. 64 The court held that the defendants' arguments
were without merit because the conditions related to important penal
interests.65
After an examination of the case law, it should be found that a trial
court may make conditions that infringe on a probationer's fundamental
rights.66 Turning to the situation at hand, sexual offenders on probation
cannot merely state that a trial court's condition, which requires them to
post signs telling the community about their offense, is unconstitutional
because it infringes on their First Amendment right not to be compelled to
speak.6 7 Though probationers subjected to shaming conditions are being
forced to speak against their will, individuals on probation do not have the
same right as ordinary citizens to enjoy constitutional privileges.6 8
Therefore, these conditions pass constitutional muster. The fact still
remains, however, that the probation requirements or conditions must be
reasonably related to the goals of probation; 69 if they are not, the conditions
will fail. 7° Whether these conditions meet the requirement of being
rationally related to the goals of probation will be discussed in the future
71
sections.
II.

THE GOALS OF PROBATION

Though Part I found that a defendant's fundamental right to free
speech may be breached by his probation requirement, this does not
necessarily mean that the condition passes constitutional scrutiny. There
are other constitutional requirements that a trial court's probation condition

The defendants argued that the lecture condition was
64. Id. at 198.
governmentally compelled "reprogramming" that violated their First Amendment right to
freedom of speech, religion, and association. Id.
65. Id. at 200.
66. See supra Part I.B. 1-4.
67. See discussion supra Part I.B.
68. See supra Part I.B.
69. See infra Part II; see also Schave, 186 F.3d at 843 (holding that conditions that
infringe on fundamental rights of the probationer will not be struck down if they have a
reasonable relationship to the goals of treating the offender and protecting the public);
Ritter, 118 F.3d at 504 ("[S]upervisory conditions that implicate fundamental rights such as
freedom of speech and freedom of association are subject to careful review, but if primarily
designed to meet the ends of rehabilitation and protection of the public, they are generally
upheld."); Carswell v. State, 721 N.E.2d 1255, 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the
only limitation placed on trial courts' discretion is that the probation requirement have a
reasonable relationship to the rehabilitation of accused and protection of the public).
70. See infra Part II.
71.
See discussion infra Parts II, IV.
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must meet-mainly the requirement that the condition must be reasonably
related to the rehabilitation of the offender. 72 This section will examine
the requirements that a trial judge's condition must meet.
Probation is usually reserved for convicted criminals whose release
into the community poses a low risk to the safety of the public and
promotes rehabilitation. 73
Probation is not a right, but is instead a
privilege which may be withheld or granted at the discretion of the trial
court.74 If the probationer is unsatisfied, he "is free to reject terms of
probation which limit his future rights and instead may accept the
punishment imposed for his crime. ,,75 However, because prisons are so
overcrowded, probation is extremely necessary in our criminal justice
system.7 6 Therefore, probation should not merely be seen as the grace of
the judge, but perhaps as a necessary function of the law.
When deciding what type of probation conditions to give to a
defendant, the trial court has broad discretion." The trial judge has great
discretion in deciding what conditions to give. Also, statutes frequently
state that the trial court "may" give certain conditions to a person on
79
probation. 78 However, a trial court's discretion is not without limits.

72. See supra note 69.
73. People v. Welch, 851 P.2d 802, 805 (Cal. 1993).
74. State v. Welsh, 853 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); see also Johnson,
659 N.E.2d at 198 (stating that probation is not a right, but rather a matter of grace and
limited liberty that is a courtesy).
75. See Welsh, 853 S.W.2d at 470 (noting that the defendant had the option of
rejecting the conditions of his probation and choosing to accept the jail sentence that would
have been imposed).
76. See Leonore H. Tavill, Note, Scarlet Letter Punishment: Yesterday's Outlawed
Penalty is Today's ProbationCondition, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 613, 615 (1988) (noting that
the chance of a defendant being sentenced to jail decreases every day). Prisons are operating
way beyond their capacities. State prison systems are operating at 110%, while federal
prison systems are operating at 124%. Id. Therefore, judges are using alternative sentences,
instead of prison, more frequently. Id. at 618.
77. People v. Bianco, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392, 396 (Ct. App. 2001) ("[T]he state
Legislature has vested the trial courts with broad discretion to impose conditions of
probation."); See also State v. Johnston, 31 P.3d 1101, 1106 n.6 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) ("Trial
courts have broad discretion in imposing special conditions of probation.").
78. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A § 3563 (b) (West 2000) ("The court may provide, as
further conditions of a sentence of probation .... ); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.03 (1) (West
2001 & Supp. 2002) ("[T]he court shall determine the terms and conditions of probation or
community control."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-313 (1997 & Supp. 2001) ("[T]he court
may . ..place such defendant on probation upon such reasonable conditions as it may
require ...").
79. See, e.g., United States v. Balogun, 146 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting
that though the phrase "any other condition" may seem to give trial courts unlimited
discretion, this court did not believe it gave "untrammeled discretion."); State v. Brillhart,
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Conditions that are arbitrary or unreasonable are an abuse of the trial
court's discretion. 80 The conditions that trial judges give a person on
probation must have a rational relationship to the goals of probation, which
include the probationer's rehabilitation and protection of the public. 81
Therefore, the trial courts have a dual duty to not only protect society, but
also rehabilitate the defendant.82
These dual goals should always be the focus of the trial judge. In the
case, Gordy v. State, the Indiana Appellate Court stated:
The sentencing judge has a broad power to impose
conditions designed to serve the accused and the
community. The only limitation is that the conditions have
a reasonable relationship to the treatment of the accused
and the protection of the public. The object, of course, is
to produce a law-abiding citizen and at the same time to
protect the public against continued criminal or anti-social
behavior.83
A trial court, however, cannot just order a requirement and then state
that the requirement fosters the dual goals of protecting society and
rehabilitating the defendant; rather, the trial court's probation condition
must be reasonably related to these goals. 84 A Wisconsin court held that
"reasonableness and appropriateness of a condition of probation is
determined by how well it serves the dual goals of probation; namely, the
rehabilitation of the offender and the protection of the state and community
interest." 85 A United States Court of Appeals also focused on the
reasonableness of probation conditions. It stated that a probation condition
"will be found valid if it is reasonably related to the twin aims of probation:
rehabilitating the defendant and protecting the public. 8 6 The court noted
717 N.E.2d 413, 415 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (stating that the "trial court has broad, but not
unlimited, discretion in fashioning the conditions of probation.").
80. See, e.g., Welch, 851 P.2d at 806 (stating that the sentencing court violates its
discretion when its condition is arbitrary, capricious or goes beyond reason, after
considering all circumstances).
81. See, e.g., State v. Shepard, 554 N.W.2d 821, 823 (N.D. 1996) (stating that the
only limitation on the trial court's imposition of probation conditions are that they "must be
reasonably necessary to ensure that the defendant will lead a law abiding life or assist him to
do so.").
82. See Gordy v. State, 674 N.E.2d 190, 191-92 (Ind.Ct. App. 1996).
83. Id. at 191-92.
84. See infra notes 85-89.
85. State v. Brown, 497 N.W.2d 463, 464 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
86. United States v. Friedberg, 78 F.3d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 1996).
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that if a condition were found to be unnecessarily harsh or excessive, then
the condition would not be found reasonable and would fail.87 The
California Supreme Court held that trial judges may impose reasonable
conditions in order to protect the public safety and foster any rehabilitation
and reformation of the probationer. 88 While the Illinois Supreme Court
stated that trial courts may, in its discretion impose additional conditions in
order to foster the rehabilitation and protection of the public, those
conditions must be reasonable.89
Even though the rehabilitation of the offender and protection of
society have been deemed the dual goals of a probation requirement, some
courts have found that a focus on rehabilitation should be the main goal of
a probation condition. In Ohio, it was held that trial courts, in the interest
of justice, must order additional conditions of probation to rehabilitate the
offender in order to ensure future acceptable behavior. 90 In California, an
appellate court held that trial courts have wide discretion in making
probation conditions, which aid in reforming and rehabilitating the
defendant. 91 The strongest statement was made by the Court of Appeals of
New York, which stated that the legislature did not make any reference to
punishment or deterrence as a goal of probationary conditions, but instead
restricted probation conditions to those that are reasonably related to the
rehabilitation of the defendant.92 States such as Tennessee and Connecticut
also have held that there should be a focus on the rehabilitation of the
defendant. 93

87. Id.
88. People v. Carbajal, 899 P.2d 67, 70 (Cal. 1995) (holding that trial court
breached its discretionary duty when the probation requirements were arbitrary or
capricious).
89. People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315, 318 (II. 1997).
90. State v. Williams, 611 N.E.2d 443, 445 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
91. People v. Brewer, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 293, 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
92. State v. Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d 146, 149 (N.Y. 1995) (stating that New York
Penal Law § 65.10 only has a rehabilitative goal). Butsee State v. Myatt, 681 N.Y.S.2d 114,
116 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (stating that a legislative amendment to Penal Law § 65.10
overrules the New York Court of Appeals holding that there is only a rehabilitative purpose
in probation). The court noted that New York Penal Law § 65.10 [5], which is titled "Other
conditions," provides: "When imposing a sentence of probation the court may, in addition to
any conditions imposed . . . require that the defendant comply with any other reasonable
condition as the court shall determine to be necessary or appropriate to ameliorate the
conduct which gave rise to the offense or to prevent the incarceration of the defendant." Id.
93. State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82, 87 (Tenn. 1996) (holding that the laws of
Tennessee cannot be interpreted as giving the trial court limitless authority to prescribe
punishments that are outside the bounds of rehabilitation); State v. Pieger, 692 A.2d 1273,
1277-78 (Conn. 1997) (holding that if the trial court was reasonable in its belief that the
probation conditions were consistent with the defendant's rehabilitation, then it must stand).
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This goal of rehabilitating the defendant can be found in legislation as
well. The federal sentencing guidelines-and almost all state statutesrequire that trial courts make probation conditions that not only protect the
public, but also assist with the offender's rehabilitation.9 4 For example,
Colorado requires that "[t]he conditions of probation shall be such as the
court in its discretion deems reasonably necessary to ensure that the
defendant will lead a law-abiding life and to assist the defendant in doing
so." 9 In Florida, trial courts must require an evaluation of a probationer in
96
order to determine if a person on probation should receive treatment.
Also, the State of Ohio requires all trial courts to "use all suitable methods,
not inconsistent with the conditions of probation or parole, to aid and
encourage the persons under its supervision or in its custody and to bring
about improvement in their conduct or condition. 97 The United States
Sentencing Guidelines also note that the trial court could impose other
conditions to the extent that the conditions are reasonably related to "the
need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective
treatment . . . ,98 This focus on the rehabilitation of defendants can be
found in other state statutes as well. 99
After reviewing both the case law and the legislation, it is obvious that
the rehabilitation of the defendant should always be the focus of trial courts

See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-204 (1) (West 1998 & Supp. 2002). This
statute also states that a defendant who is a sex offender must comply with any court orders
regarding their treatment. Id.
96. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.03 (4) (West 2001 & Supp. 2002). If the court
determines there is a need for treatment after a diagnosis, the court must require outpatient
counseling as a condition of the defendant's probation. Id.
97. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2301.30 (C) (Anderson 2001).
98. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3 (b)(1)(D) (West 1996 & Supp.
2001).
99. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-30 (a) (West 2001) ("When imposing a sentence
of probation or conditional discharge, the court may, as a condition of the sentence, order
that the defendant ... undergo medical or psychiatric treatment and remain in a specified
institution, when required for that purpose... undergo specialized sexual offender treatment
.... ); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.100 (a) (Michie 2000) ("While on probation and among the
conditions of probation, the defendant may be required ... to participate in or comply with
the treatment plan of an inpatient or outpatient rehabilitation program specified by either the
court or the defendant's probation officer that is related to the defendant's offense or to the
defendant's rehabilitation .... "); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 771.1 (2) (West 2000) (noting
that if a defendant is possibly eligible for probation the court may delay the defendant's
sentencing in order to give the defendant an opportunity to prove their eligibility for
probation which is consistent with the justice and the defendant's rehabilitation).
94.

95.
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when making probation requirements.' 00
Without rehabilitation
probationers cannot become the law-abiding citizens that society would
like them to become.' 0 ' This is especially true for the sexual offender who,
as discussed earlier, has a high rate of recidivism. 0 2 Therefore, the next
questions become - (1) What are the standards of rehabilitation for the sex
offender? (2) Can the sexual offender be rehabilitated? (3) And, if so,
what types of psychological methods seem to work best with the sexual
offender? Answers to these questions will be discussed in the next part of
this comment.
III. PSYCHOLOGY AND THE SEXUAL OFFENDER
The goals of probation are not only to protect society from the
offender, but also to rehabilitate the offender. 10 3 In order to analyze the
probation requirement of rehabilitating the offender, this part will first
explore what methods of psychological treatment are used to make an
offender a productive member of our society. In order to see what
procedures best help rehabilitate the offender, this part examines the realms
of psychological treatment for the sexual offender.
A. THE DEBATE OVER THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TREATMENT

The acts of a sex offender affect many Americans; 1 4 however, due to
the overcrowding of prisons, there has been much attention given to
alternatives to incarceration for these defendants. 0 5 The most frequently
used alternative is psychological treatment.1°6 However, there has been a
great deal of debate over the effectiveness of such treatment. 107 Some
experts argue that treatment does not help lower recidivism among sexual

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See supra notes 72-99 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.
See supra note 5.
See supra Part II.
See Robert J. McGrath, Stephen E. Hoke & John E. Vojtisek, Cognitive-

Behavioral Treatment of Sex Offenders: A Treatment Comparison and Long-Term FollowUp Study, 25 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 203, 203-04 (1998) [hereinafter Treatment

Comparison] (stating that 20% of women and 5-10% of men in America have experienced
some form of sexual abuse as a child).
105. Id. at 204.
106. Id. (stating that among some of the alternatives to prison have been community
and prison based treatment programs).
107. See id.
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offenders, 0 8 whereas others believe that sexual offenders cannot be helped
at all.' 0 9 Therefore, if psychological treatment is ineffective, alternatives
such as "shaming" penalties may be a viable solution.
Pessimistic views such as these detract from the importance of
psychological treatment. No proof in any psychological findings supports
the conclusion that sex offenders cannot be treated." 0 There is no proof that
sex offenders are merely out of control and cannot stop themselves from
acting on their urges."' Generally, while a majority of people who face
some sort of addiction feel as if they cannot control themselves this,
however, is not the case. 1 2 Modem research indicates that there is no
proof that sex offenders suffer from any cognitive disorder that renders
them unable to control their behavior. 1 3 Though it could be easily said that
not
sex offenders have sexual urges that they would like to satisfy, it has
14
controlled.
be
cannot
urges
these
that
determined
conclusively
been

108. See id. (stating that some studies have concluded that there is no support that
treatment actually helps lower the chance for recidivism in the sex offender); Jan Looman,
Jeffrey Abracen & Terry P. Nicholaichuk, Recidivism Among Treated Sexual Offenders and
Matched Controls: Data From the Regional Centre (Ontario), 15 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 279 (2000) [hereinafter Data from Ontario] (asserting that there is little
agreement in the studies as to whether sex offender treatment actually is effective).
109. See Tavill, supra note 76, at 641 (arguing it is clear that rehabilitating a sex
offender is difficult if not impossible).
110. See Winick, supra note 1, at 520 (arguing that there is nothing in clinical
literature which would support any conclusion that pedophiles cannot control their
behavior).
111. See id. at 521 (noting that there is no theoretical or empirical support for the
argument that people who have pedophilia are unable to prevent themselves from acting on
their strong sexual urges).
112. Id.at520-21.
113. See id. at 523-24 (stating that there is no proof that pedophiles suffer from any
cognitive impairment that affects their ability to understand that their conduct is wrong or
that renders them irrational to control their behavior. The author compared pedophiles, who
can control their behavior, to those with Tourette's Syndrome or multiple personality
disorder who have a cognitive disorder and cannot control their behavior).
114. See id. (arguing that though pedophiles have strong urges for children that they
would like to satisfy, there is nothing in diagnostic criteria to suggest that these urges render
individuals unable to avoid acting on these desires. It was noted that people don't molest
children in front of police, but instead use deception.); see also Tavill, supra note 76, at 642.
"Child molesters are creative and able to design innovative methods to lure children in their
net." Id.
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STUDIES OF THE TREATMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS

Because sexual offenders can be treated and recidivism rates can be
lowered, if not eliminated, this comment will examine which methods work
best for sex offenders. There is a significant amount of evidence that
shows that there is great variability in the recidivism rates amongst sex
offenders." 5 Studies suggest that exhibitionists and pedophiles are more
likely to re-offend than other sex offenders." 16 There are other studies that
found that rapists have higher rates of recidivism than child molesters,
whereas incest offenders
were found to have lower rates of recidivism than
7
child molesters." 1
Looking at the study of treatment options, one will find great
variability. Candace Kruttschnitt, Christopher Uggen, and Kelly Shelton
did a retrospective study of 556 sexual offenders placed on probation
between 1992-1997 in Minnesota." 8 They used both informal social
controls (employment and marital status) and formal social controls
(whether drug testing was ordered as a condition, were they told to avoid
contact with minors, and was mandatory attendance at sexual treatment
sessions required). ' 19 After five years, it was learned that 5.6% of the
offenders committed a new sexual offense. 20 It was discovered that people
with a juvenile arrest record and history of criminal acts were more likely
to re-offend.' 2' The study also found that age seemed to have had a strong
negative impact on re-offending. 22 However, it was found that the main
factor that reduces recidivism in sexual offenders
is the combined effect of
23
stable employment, treatment, and supervision. 1
A study by Robert J. McGrath, Stephen E. Hoke, and John E. Vojtisek
used a comprehensive cognitive behavioral and relapse-prevention
treatment to see if the sexual offender's recidivism rate could be

115. Candace Kruttschnitt, Christopher Uggen & Kelly Shelton, Predictors of
DesistanceAmong Sex Offenders: The Interactionof Formal andInformal Social Controls,
17 JUST. Q. 61, 65 (2000) [hereinafter FormalSocial Controls].
116. Id. But see Tavill, supra note 76, at 638 (noting that a study found that
pedophiles had the lowest recidivism rates).
117. Formal Social Controls,supra note 115, at 66.
118. Id. at 67.
119. Id. at 69.
120. Id. at 73.
121. Id. at 74.
122. Id. at 75-76 (stating that with each one year increase in age the chance of reoffending is reduced by 3%.).
123. FormalSocial Controls, supra note 115, at 81.
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lowered. 124 The participants of this study were convicted adult male sex
offenders placed on probation for at least three months. 25 There were three
different groups: a specialized treatment group that included seventy-one
people, a non-specialized treatment group of thirty-two people, and a no
treatment group of nineteen people. 126 It should be noted that the
difference between the specialized and non-specialized group was that the
specialized group received a specialized cognitive treatment and relapse
prevention for three months with frequent communication between the
treatment staff and the probation officer, whereas the non-specialized
treatment group did not receive such in-depth treatment, and there was no
frequent communication between the treatment staff and the probation
officer. 127 The results found that only 1.4% of the participants in the
specialized group committed a new sexual offense, whereas 15.6% of the
non-specialized group and 10.5% of the no-treatment group committed a
new sex offense. 128 The authors argued that these results show that
cognitive-behavioral and relapse prevention treatment is effective with
29

sexual offenders. 1

Jan Looman, Jeffrey Abracen, and Terry P. Nicholaichuk did a
comparative investigation in which there were eighty-nine treated people
matched with eighty-nine untreated people. 130 It should also be noted that
the treated group was comprised of sexual offenders that were assessed as

124. Treatment Comparison, supra note 104, at 205 (stating that they used a
"combination of (a) correctional supervision designed to limit offender access to potential
victims, and (b) treatment designed to help offenders identify and modify the types of
feelings, thoughts, situations, and behaviors that were proximal to their sexually aggressive
acts.").
125. Id. at 206.
126. Id. at 206-08.
127. Id. at 209-14 (noting that the specialized treatment group also received
ancillary treatment, such as referrals to Alcoholics Anonymous and job training programs).
Within the specialized group 91.5% participated in group therapy, while 8.5% of the
participants had individual therapy because they lacked the cognitive skills to be a part of
group therapy. Id. at 209. The specialized treatment group's initial step was accepting
responsibility. The next goal was to modify their cognitive distortions, which are selfstatements made by sex offenders to minimize what they did, and then develop empathy for
the victim. The group members then underwent behavioral conditioning to help them
control or eliminate their deviant sexual arousal or attempt to strengthen appropriate sexual
arousal. The final steps are to improve social competence and develop their relapseprevention skills. Id. at 211-14.
128. Treatment Comparison,supra note 104, at 217-18. The results came after a 12
year study. Id. at 206.
129. Id. at 219.
130. DATA FROM ONTARIO, supra note 108, at 286.
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having a higher risk of recidivism.13 1 The results in this study were
shocking. At the end of the investigation it was found that in the treated
group 23.6% of the sexual offenders were convicted of a new sexual
offense, whereas 51.7% of the sex offenders in the untreated group reoffended. 132
The studies support the proposition that using psychological treatment
does have an impact on the recidivism rates of sex offenders. 33 Overall, the
use of cognitive treatment has the greatest positive impact on recidivism
rates. 34 It follows, then, that more research should be done in order to
expand on the effectiveness of psychological treatment. However, because
psychological treatment seems to be the most effective method to prevent
recidivism in sex offenders, the results of the psychological treatment must
be protected so as not to be interfered with.
IV. SHAMING CONDITIONS FAIL TO RATIONALLY RELATE TO THE GOALS
OF PROBATION

Thus far, this comment has examined how forcing an individual to
post a sign on his private property stating a message with which he
disagrees, would violate his First Amendment rights of freedom from
compelled speech.135 However, it was also shown that individuals on
probation (i.e., sexual offenders on probation who are forced to post these
signs) do not enjoy the same fundamental rights as do law-abiding
individuals.1 36 Nonetheless, a trial court's probation requirement must
rationally relate to the dual goals of probation: protection of society and
rehabilitation of the offender.' 37 It was also found that psychological
treatment along with stable employment js the most effective way to
38
rehabilitate a sexual offender and counteract recidivism.'
After examining this information, one question remains: Do such
"shaming" conditions in probation, such as requiring a sexual offender to

131. Id. at 284, 286 (stating that the main difference between the treated and
untreated groups was that the treated group committed more sexual crimes; the average for
the treated group was 1.8 sexual offenses per participant, whereas the untreated group had
an average of 1.3).
132. Id. at 286.
133. See supra notes 120, 128, 132 and accompanying text.
134. Treatment Comparison, supra note 104, at 217-18 (showing an extremely low
recidivism rate for treated sexual offenders at a mere 1.4%).
135. See supra Part I.A.
136. See supra Part I.B.
137. See supra Part II.
138. See supra Part Ill.
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post signs in front of his home and to apply a bumper sticker to his car,
help foster this rehabilitation and protection of the community, and,
therefore, relate to the dual goals of probation? Or, are shaming conditions
illogical and adverse to the goals of probation and, therefore, fail?
Many believe that requiring signs outside the home of a sex offender
helps foster the goals of probation. Arguably, such conditions protect
society because they warn the community about the fact that there is a
sexual offender amongst them, and that he may be dangerous.' 39 This way,
parents can protect their children and warn them never to go near the
offender. 140 The bumper stickers could also be seen as a warning.141
Adults and children alike can read the bumper sticker and realize that there
may be a dangerous person inside the vehicle and, therefore, stay away
from the car and its occupant. 42 Secondly, it has been argued that the
conditions help advance the goals of rehabilitation. For example, these
signs will be a constant reminder to the sexual offender that what he did
was unacceptable behavior and will reinforce the idea that when he breaks
the law he will be punished. 43 Finally, it has been asserted that the
community can also get involved with the offender's rehabilitation by
keeping themselves and their children away from the offender. 144 This may
the offender that he will not be
help reinforce societal norms by telling
145
accepted until he conforms to the law.
Though these arguments may seem persuasive and logical on the
surface, when one makes a more in-depth examination, obvious problems
arise with "shaming" a sexual offender by forcing them to post signs in
their yards and bumper stickers on their cars. This comment will next
explore the problems with "shaming" a sexual offender. This examination
will show that requiring a sexual offender to put up signs and bumper
stickers does not rationally relate to the goals of probation, and, therefore,
should be prohibited.

139. See Rosalind K. Kelley, Comment, Sentenced to Wear the Scarlet Letter:
JudicialInnovations in Sentencing-Are They Constitutional?,93 DICK. L. REV. 759, 78384 (1989) (saying that identifying and controlling those that pose a threat protects society).
140. See Thomas & Hylton, supra note 12, at 82. Judge J. Manuel Banales states
that forcing a sex offender to put up such signs "will keep people like you, sir, honest. Your
neighbors will watch you and make sure you're not taking another child into your home."

Id.

141. Id.
142. Jeffrey C. Filcik, Signs of the Times: Scarlet Letter Probation Conditions, 37
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 291, 322 (stating that with the signs parents will probably
keep their children away from the offender).
143. See Kelley, supra note 139, at 781.
144. See Filcik, supra note 142, at 322.
145. Id.
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Rehabilitation is an important and necessary part of probation. This is
especially true for the sexual offender because of his high chance of
recidivism. 146 One of the only ways to rehabilitate the sexual offender and
make him a productive member of society is through psychological
treatment.1 47 However, "shaming" requirements, such as signs and bumper
stickers, have an adverse affect
on the treatment of the sexual offender, and
48
instead make matters worse.
A.

LABELING OF THE SEXUAL OFFENDER

The first problem with forcing an offender to post a sign and/or
bumper sticker is that it labels the sexual offender.149 The sexual offender
may begin to believe he is nothing more than a sexual offender and that his
condition is unchangeable. 50 Therefore, the offender may feel hopeless
and believe that it is inevitable for him to re-offend. 5 ' Then, instead of
seeking help for his problem, the offender may just believe that something
is wrong with him and find ways to re-offend. 152 This is obviously adverse
to the goals of rehabilitation. Society wants the sexual offender to believe
that he can be helped, seek out such help, and become a productive member
of our society. 53 It is not desired that sexual offenders give up, and
possibly decide to re-offend. Labeling an offender may make him deviate
further from the norm, and is obviously adverse to the second goal of
probation: protection of the community. 154

146. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
147. See supra Part III.
148. See infra Part IV.A-B.
149. Winick, supra note 1, at 556.
150. Id. at 556 (stating that such a label may make sex offenders come to feel as
though their whole identity is that of a sexual offender).
151. Id. at 556 (arguing that many sexual offenders believe they cannot control their
urges to re-offend). The author argues that this label may make them believe that their
behavior is due to some internal problem that cannot be changed, and this produces their
belief that they are hopeless. Id. at 556-57.
152. Id. at 557. (arguing that such labels will inhibit the sex offender from seeking
help or controlling their behavior); see also Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame
Implicationsfor Legal Reform, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 645, 694 (1997) (arguing that
labeling a defendant a "deviant" could cause more deviance or criminal acts).
153. Winick, supra note 1, at 557; see also supra Part II (examining the goals of
probation which include rehabilitating the offender).
154. Winick, supra note 1, at 557 (author argues that community registration and
notification laws may frustrate the goals of probation, which are "to prevent recidivism by
sexual offenders by encouraging them to take responsibility for their actions and undergo
rehabilitation").
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Unfortunately, the problem of labeling the sexual offender does not
end with his self-hate. A sexual offender can also experience problems
with stigmatization by the community.' 5 5 This also has an adverse affect
on the sexual offender. Sometimes the public humiliation of these
"shaming" conditions can make a sexual offender depressed, embarrassed
to go outside, or even worse.1 56 Public humiliation cannot be seen as a goal
of probation. 57 In fact, we do not know enough about "shaming" in order
to predict how the defendant is likely to react. 58 It is very hard for people
59
to predict how the offender will react to his privacy being invaded.
Instead of the desired shame and conformance with the law, the offender
may instead feel anger and resentment.160 This lack of understanding about
shaming is one of the reasons the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that a
a sexual offender to post signs stating his
probation condition requiring
161
offense is impermissible.

155. See id. at 555.
156. See, e.g., Broughton, supra note 13 (noting that one of the men who were
forced to post a sign stating that he is a sexual offender attempted suicide). Gabriel Trevino,
a probationer who must post a sign stating that he is a sexual offender, said that a two to
twenty year prison term would possibly have been better then having the sign. Thomas &
Hylton, supra note 12, at 82. Trevino states, "I can't even go out and cut my yard. I just
stay in the house .... I was doing good in therapy. How is this helping me?" Id.
157. See Meyer, 680 N.E.2d at 320 (court held that humiliation is not a permissible
condition of probation). The Supreme Court of Illinois overturned a probation condition
that required the defendant to post a sign saying "Warning! A Violent Felon lives here.
Enter at your own Risk!" Id. at 317. The court held that this condition did not rationally
relate to the goals of probation. Id. at 320.
158. See Massaro, supra note 152, at 663 (arguing that no one can predict when
shame will occur in an individual). There is no guarantee that such conditions will bring
about the desired shame. Instead, for example, such conditions may bring about anger or
resentment. Id. at 672. Even when someone does feel shame this does not necessarily mean
that the desired effect of the offender abstaining from the undesired conduct will come
about. Id. at 648.
159. Id. at 665-66 (arguing that an invasion of one's privacy instead of evoking
shame may evoke anger, anxiety, or other such emotions).
160. Id.
161. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d at 87. The Tennessee Supreme Court held that the
consequences of imposing this condition without a legislative study or debate are uncertain.
Id. The court also noted that "[iun addition to being novel and somewhat bizarre,
compliance with the condition would have consequences in the community, perhaps
beneficial, perhaps detrimental, but in any event unforeseen and unpredictable." Id.
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B. EFFECTS ON THE OFFENDER'S LIFE

"Shaming" penalties adversely affect an offender's normal life, which
can inhibit the offender's rehabilitation, due to the stigmatization the
offender may encounter. These notification laws can cause prospective
employers to avoid hiring these probationers. 162 Further, probationers that
have a job could possibly be fired due to these signs.' 63 This not only leaves
the probationer with no means to support himself or his family, but it could
also have an adverse affect on his ability to reform. Having employment is
a very important part of the rehabilitation of the sexual offender.164 It has
been found that sexual offenders that have steady employment are less
likely to recidivate. 165 Therefore, these probation conditions can cause 166a
loss of employment, and instead bring about an increase in recidivism.
This increase in recidivism is counter to the second goal of probationprotecting the community-because it makes the offender more of a risk to
167
the community, instead of less.
"Shaming" conditions, which force a sexual offender to post signs and
bumper stickers stating that he was convicted of a sex crime, can bring
other problems to the sexual offender and his family. Because of shaming
conditions, sexual offenders have found themselves and their families
being threatened.1 68 Vigilantism is not a goal of probation. The goal of
probation is to rehabilitate the offender so he can become a law-abiding
citizen;'69 instead, both the offender and his family are in fear all of the
time.1 70 For example, after being threatened by a neighbor, a sex offender
162. See Winick, supra note 1, at 555.
163. See Thomas & Hylton, supra note 12, at 82 (noting that this type of notification
is causing bosses to fire such probationers).
164. See Mike Brogden & Sharon Harkin, Community Rules Preventing ReOffending by Child Sex Abusers- A Life History Approach, 28 INT'L J. Soc. L. 45, 59 (2000)
(stating that work has several benefits, including the fact that it imposes its own restraints,
and can bring about discipline and control).
165. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
166. See Brogden & Harkin, supra note 164, at 59 (arguing that though
unemployment does not cause abuse, the pressures of unemployment can affect the
offender's social networks, such as his family, which discourage abuse).
167. See supra Part II.
168. See, e.g., 20/20, supra note 1. John Lee, a sex offender forced to put up the
signs and bumper sticker as a condition of his probation, stated that the bumper sticker
makes him feel like a target. In fact, while driving one day Lee stated that someone pointed
an imaginary gun at him. Id. Lee stated "I felt like it's open season for vigilantes to just
come over there. And that's not a good feeling." Id.
169. See discussion supra Part II.
170. See Thomas & Hylton, supra note 12, at 82 (stepdaughter of a sex offender
forced to use the signs said "I'm scared for my mother's life and myself.").
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on probation and his father were evicted from their apartment.17' Having
such family problems can have a very adverse affect on recidivism in the
offender. 72 Even more troubling is the fact that these penalties are having
such an adverse effect on the offender's family. 73 The offender committed
the crime, not his family, and the fact that these probation conditions are
putting the offender's
family in danger should be enough to make such
74
conditions fail.
A final problem with these conditions is that these penalties do not
have a method of undoing the stigmatization of the offender. 75 The sexual
offender on probation will have to deal with the problems of stigmatization
for years after the "shaming."' 17 6 There are no procedures that can
reintegrate the offenders into society. 177 One of the major goals of
probation is to rehabilitate the offender so that he can become a
reintegrated, law-abiding individual. 7 8 However, if after the probation, a
sexual offender cannot find a job, is shunned by the community, and has to
deal with the guilt of his family being ignored by the community, then the
goals of probation have not been met. 18790 This is especially true because
there is an increased risk of recidivism. 1
"Shaming" conditions, such as requiring a sexual offender to place
signs on his house and bumper stickers on his car, are adverse to both goals
of probation: rehabilitating the defendant and protection of the
community.'81 Therefore, such probation conditions cannot be seen as
rationally relating to the goals of probation. Hence, such shaming

171. See 20/20, supra note 1 (a neighbor told the offender's father to go live in a
cave, and then they were evicted).
172. See Brogden & Harkin, supra note 164, at 59 (family and community
relationships might discourage abuse, and should not be affected).
173. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d at 320 (states that the nature and location of sign, in front of
offender's home, could have an adverse effect on people that live with the offender).
174. Id. (holding that the effect that the signs have on others also renders it
impermissible as a probation condition).
175. See Polly S. Woods, CriminalJustice; Shame on You, TEX. LAW., Apr. 7, 1997,
at 37 (arguing that in the United States after we shame the offender we do not have methods
to reintegrate them in the community and remove their stigma), available at LEXIS, News
Library, Txlawr File.
176. See Winick, supra note 1, at 556 (arguing that notification of the sexual
offender crimes to the community will have consequences that will last for many years and
possibly for a lifetime).
177.

See supra note 175.

179.

See supra notes 162-74 and accompanying text.

178. See supra Part II.

180. See supra notes 150-54, 164-74 and accompanying text.
181. See supra Part IV. A-B.
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requirements should be impermissible in a sex offender's probation

conditions.

V. SOLUTIONS AND ALTERNATIVE USES OF SHAME THAT COULD HELP
REHABILITATE SEX OFFENDERS

"Shaming" probation conditions, such as requiring signs and bumper
stickers announcing the sexual offender's offense, should not be allowed
and do not solve the problem society is facing with sexual offenders. The
fact is that sexual offenders seem to have a much higher rate of recidivism,
and their risk to society is great. 82 The next endeavor of this comment will
be discussing methods that can maximize a sexual offender's rehabilitation,
while minimizing his risk to society.
One solution is to restructure criminal codes and sentencing guidelines
so that they have a narrower focus on the rehabilitation of sexual
offenders. 83 Though protecting the community is important, legislation
such as "Megan's Law" is enough to inform the public and law
enforcement of the sexual offender's crime, and, therefore, his risk to the
community. 84 However, the sexual offender will continue to be a risk to
the community until he is fully rehabilitated and mentally stable.
Therefore, there should be a more intense emphasis on the rehabilitation of
the offender, which could include the use of productive "shaming"

182. See supra note 4.
183. See Winick, supra note 1, at 557 (questioning how registration and notification
laws can be changed "to minimize their antitherapeutic effects, and how can they be applied
to maximize their therapeutic potential.").
184. Id. at 549-50 (stating that all states require sexual offenders to register their
whereabouts in order to supply information to interested community members concerning
the sexual offenders released into the community). These statutes require sexual offenders
to register with the police department in the area that they live. Sex offenders must give
their:
name, social security number, age, race, sex, date of birth, height,
weight, hair and eye color, permanent address and any temporary
address, date and place of employment, date and place of each
conviction and the form of adjudication thereof, indictment number, a
brief description of the offense(s), and any other information required
by the state attorney general. In addition, the form must include the
individual's fingerprints, and some states require submission of a
picture, blood sample, and hair sample.
Id. at 549. In some states the information is on file and the public can acquire the
information; whereas other states have the information posted on the Internet. Id. at 549-50.

20021

"SHAMING" PROBATION PENALTIES AND THE SEXUAL OFFENDER

penalties. This solution contains two parts: an objective and a subjective
component.
Beginning with the objective part, the first things that must be
discovered are what methods are best suited to rehabilitate the sexual
offender. The lack of consistency in research tells us that there is not a
clear understanding of the rehabilitation of the sexual offender. 85
Legislation should be created that brings about a sex offender "task force,"
which should consist of psychologists and sociologists. The goal of this
"task force" should be to conduct in-depth research on what methods tend
to work best for certain sexual offenders. For example, this comment
found that exhibitionists and pedophiles were the most likely to reoffend. 86 Therefore, traditional treatment does not seem to work as well
on these offenders; hence, another psychological treatment technique
should be used.
The "task force" should also do more research on the use of
"shaming" penalties and when they could possibly be used successfully.
The lack of research and knowledge pertaining to "shaming" is what makes
conditions, such as requiring a defendant to post signs stating he is a sexual
offender, so dangerous. Currently, we have no idea how the defendant or
the community is going to react. 87 However, through research, this "task
force" may find some positive "shaming" conditions that may even help a
sex offender's rehabilitation. For example, a sexual offender who is in
total denial of why his actions were wrong could possibly be required to
have a "shaming" penalty that would help him understand what he did and
why it was wrong. A possible positive "shaming" penalty for this type of
defendant could be listening to victims of sexual abuse and learning how
their lives were changed and/or affected. The defendant could then be
required to write down what he learned and say it in open court. This could
be very good for his rehabilitation. 188
Another possible positive "shaming" condition could be requiring the
convicted sexual offender to speak with people who are behaving in ways
which exemplify that they are at risk to commit a sexual offense. This

185. See supra Part III.B. Recidivism rates in the three studies examined were quite
inconsistent: one study found 5.6% of sex offenders that received treatment re-offended,
another found that 1.4% of the treated offenders committed another sexual offense, whereas
a third study found that 23.6% of the sexual offenders that received therapy re-offended. Id.
186. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., Winick, supra note 1, at 555 (noting that requiring sexual offenders to
write out the facts of their crime can help end the denial that many sexual offenders suffer
from and help the offenders understand the negative consequences that their actions posed
for the victim, thus helping with their rehabilitation).
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way, he could possibly learn and accept the fact that what he did was
89
wrong and not worry about stigmatization from the whole community.'
But, merely ordering defendants who are on probation to post signs in front
of their houses and put bumper stickers on their cars which state that they
are convicted sex offenders is adverse to the goals of rehabilitating the
defendant and should not be used.
This "task force" should create a list of treatment options and positive
"shaming" penalties that are best suited for certain sexual offenders. These
options should be placed in the probation codes or guidelines as the
procedures that should be used to help rehabilitate the sexual offenders.
Therefore, instead of codes and guidelines merely stating that the trial court
in its discretion should give conditions of probation that help rehabilitate
the defendant,1 90 the trial court has an objective list that it could use as a
guide when creating the treatment and condition requirements for the
sexual offender on probation.
The endeavor should not end here; there must also be a subjective
part. The trial court should only use this list of treatment options and
positive "shaming" penalties as a guideline that it could move away from if
it is found necessary. Legislation should also require a full psychological
hearing for the sexual offender in order to determine which treatment
options and/or conditions are best suited for the sexual offender. The
sexual offender should first have a psychological evaluation by an
independent psychologist. The psychologist can then decide if the
treatment option recommended in the legislation would be an appropriate
therapeutic method for that particular sexual offender. The psychologist
can also decide if any of the positive "shaming" penalties found in the
codes are appropriate for the particular offender.
The psychologist's opinion, however, should not be the only one
considered at this hearing; the defendant should be able to take an active
role.1 9 In this scenario, the defendant could testify or even put on expert

189. See, e.g., Woods, supra note 175, at 37 (examining Japan's shaming culture
which is said to represent the model shame civilization). The author argued that in Japan
the focus is on rehabilitation and reintegration. Id. "That is, great weight is placed upon
confession and acceptance of blame followed by attempts to rehabilitate and reintegrate the
Id. The Japanese attempt to do this without any
offender into the community .... .
stigmatization to the individual. Id.
190. See supra Part 11.
191. See, e.g., Winick, supra note 1, at 565 (examining reclassification hearings for
the sexual offender). The author argues that instead of allowing state officials to decide
reclassification of a defendant unilaterally, allowing sexual offenders to participate in the
hearings could have significant value in their therapy. Id. People who are allowed to
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testimony that might counter the court's psychologist's opinion as to the
treatment and/or conditions that the offender should receive. This should
be done because the trial court should not just decide the conditions or
treatment based on the crime alone. Instead, the court should also look at
the defendant's personality, and his need for certain conditions.' 92 For
example, even if the psychologist believes a certain positive "shaming"
penalty could help reinforce therapy, it could be devastating to the
particular offender. Different people react in different ways, and the court
should not be allowed to give conditions that could possibly damage the
rehabilitation of the defendant. After weighing this information, the court
can decide what would be the best-suited probation conditions for the
particular defendant.
Psychological therapy gives the sexual offender the best chance for
rehabilitation and integration into the community. 193 Therefore, much more
focus must be put on the rehabilitation of the sexual offender. 9 4 Through
these solutions, we can begin to learn of ways that would help rehabilitate a
sexual offender on probation, rather than using penalties which are counterproductive.
CONCLUSION

Sexual abuse is one of the larger problems in the criminal justice
system today. The fact remains that jails are overcrowded, and many
sexual offenders will be put on probation. 95 Despite legislation such as
"Megan's Law," these offenders continue to recidivate. Desperate to
control this outbreak, some trial judges have decided to use "shaming"
probation conditions which require the sexual offender to post a sign on his
home and a bumper sticker on his car, hoping that this will better warn the
community and, ultimately, rehabilitate these offenders.
However
admirable the trial court's reasoning for imposing such a condition, all
probation conditions must be reasonably related to the goals of probation:

participate and tell their side of the story feel as though they were taken seriously by the
officer, and accept the outcome better. Id.
192. But see, Phaedra Athena O'Hara Kelly, Comment, The Ideology of Shame: An
Analysis of First Amendment And Eighth Amendment Challenges to Scarlet-Letter
Probation Conditions, 77 N.C. L. REV. 783, 860 (1999) (arguing that a subjective test
concentrating on the defendant's sensitivities is flawed, and a more objective standard
looking at how a reasonable person would find the condition is more appropriate).
193. See supra Part III.
194. Id.
195. See supra Part II.
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196
protection of the community and rehabilitation of the offender.
Requiring a sexual offender on probation to post a sign in front of his
residence and a bumper sticker on his car does not rationally relate to the
goals of probation. Such conditions adversely affect an offender's
rehabilitation and fail to protect the community. 97 Therefore, such
conditions must be found impermissible in any sexual offender's probation.
In order to solve society's problem with sexual offender recidivism,
there must be a focus on how to rehabilitate the offender.198 It is necessary
for more research to be done so society can get a better understanding of
the sexual offender. Through increased research, we can determine which
psychological treatments are the most effective at rehabilitating the sexual
offender.
Sexual offenders are one of the most hated groups in our society
today. 199 Trial courts, however, cannot be allowed to make unnecessary
and counterproductive probation conditions in order to attempt to solve this
problem. Instead, society must focus on rehabilitating the sex offender.
Only through rehabilitation can society be truly protected from the sexual
offender.
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196. Id.
197.

See supra Part IV.

198. See supra Part III.
199. See supra note I and accompanying text.

